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a b s t r a c t
Risk management is becoming increasingly important for railway companies in order to
safeguard their passengers and employees while improving safety and reducing mainte-
nance costs. However, in many circumstances, the application of probabilistic risk
analysis tools may not give satisfactory results because the risk data are incomplete
or there is a high level of uncertainty involved in the risk data. This article presents
the development of a risk management system for railway risk analysis using fuzzy rea-
soning approach and fuzzy analytical hierarchy decision making process. In the system,
fuzzy reasoning approach (FRA) is employed to estimate the risk level of each hazard-
ous event in terms of failure frequency, consequence severity and consequence proba-
bility. This allows imprecision or approximate information in the risk analysis process.
Fuzzy analytical hierarchy process (fuzzy-AHP) technique is then incorporated into the
risk model to use its advantage in determining the relative importance of the risk con-
tributions so that the risk assessment can be progressed from hazardous event level to
hazard group level and ﬁnally to railway system level. This risk assessment system can
evaluate both qualitative and quantitative risk data and information associated with a
railway system effectively and efﬁciently, which will provide railway risk analysts, man-
agers and engineers with a method and tool to improve their safety management of
railway systems and set safety standards. A case study on risk assessment of shunting
at Hammersmith depot is used to illustrate the application of the proposed risk assess-
ment system.
 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The risk, in the railway sector, can be deﬁned in relation to accidents and incidents leading to fatalities or injuries of pas-
sengers and employees [31]. Recent structured hazard identiﬁcation work within the industry has conﬁrmed the high-risk
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scenarios of the types of accidents such as collision, derailment and ﬁre [11,25,30,32]. The statistic ﬁgures of accidents and
incidents include not only workers, but also a signiﬁcant number of people not employed in the industry, including children
and members of the public. In the UK railway industry, many people have been injured and there even have been fatalities in
relation to this industry over the past years [25,27,28,34]. This shows the dangerous nature of the railway industry and
demonstrates the need for increased awareness and better safety management [2,29,33]. To assess how this can be
effectively achieved, knowledge on the nature and causes of these accidents is fundamental. Therefore, risk analysis plays
a central role in the railway safety and health management framework. The most common hazards in the railway depots
identiﬁed by the railway industry over the years [18,25,27,28,32,34] provide very useful information for risk analysis, for
example, derailment hazards, collision hazards, ﬁre hazards, electrocution hazards, falls hazards, train strike hazards, slip/
trip hazards, and platform train interface hazards. The requirement of risk analysis is to demonstrate that if risks associated
with a railway system are high, risk reduction measures must be applied or operation and maintenance have to be recon-
sidered to reduce the occurrence probabilities or to control the possible consequences. If risks are negligible, no actions
are required but the information produced needs to be recorded for audit purpose [2,11,25]. Therefore, railway engineers,
managers and safety analysts need to develop and employ risk assessment approaches for their safety management and
set safety standards.
Many of risk assessment techniques currently used in the railway industry are comparatively mature tools, which have
been developed on the basis of probabilistic risk analysis (PRA), for example, fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, Monte–
Carlo simulation, consequence analysis and equivalent fatality analysis (EFA) [8,25,27,28,32,34]. The results of using these
tools heavily rely on the availability and accuracy of the risk data [2,3,8,32]. However, in many circumstances, these methods
often do not cope well with uncertainty of information. Furthermore, the statistic data does not exist and it must be esti-
mated on the basis of expert knowledge and experience or engineering judgement. Therefore, railway risk analysts often face
the circumstances where the risk data are incomplete or there is a high level of uncertainty involved in the risk data [2,4].
Additionally, railways are a traditional industry, whose history extends for at least two centuries. Much of their safety record
depends upon concepts developed many years ago and established practices over the whole of their history. However, the
existing databases contain a lot of data and information, but the information may be both an excess of other information that
cannot be used in risk analysis or a shortage of key information of major failure events. There are numerous variables inter-
acting in a complex manner which cannot be explicitly described by an algorithm, a set of equations or a set of rules. In many
circumstances, it may be extremely difﬁcult to conduct PRA to assess the failure frequency of hazards, the probability and the
magnitudes of their possible consequences because of the uncertainty in the risk data. Although some work has been con-
ducted in this ﬁeld, no formal risk analysis tools have been developed and applied to a stable environment in the railway
industry [2,8,32]. Therefore, it is essential to develop new risk analysis methods to identify major hazards and assess the
associated risks in an acceptable way in various environments where such mature tools cannot be effectively or efﬁciently
applied. The railway depot safety problem is appropriate for examination by FRA and fuzzy-AHP.
The magnitude of a risk can usually be assessed by considering two fundamental risk parameters: failure frequency (FF)
and consequence severity (CS) [2,29,32,34]. The FF deﬁnes the number of times an event occurs over a speciﬁed period, e.g.
number events/year. The CS represents the number of fatalities, major injuries and minor injuries resulting from the occur-
rence of a particular hazardous event. However, it should be noted that the magnitude of a particular risk also highly de-
pends on the probability that the effects will happen given by the occurrence of the failure. Therefore, the probability of
current consequence caused by a particular failure should be taken into consideration in the risk assessment process to
obtain a reliable result. In order to assess the risks associated with a railway depot efﬁciently and effectively, a new risk
parameter, consequence probability (CP) is introduced in the proposed risk analysis model to determine the risk level
(RL) of a hazardous event. The use of FRA allows imprecision or approximate information involved in the risk assessment
process [3,5,18,22,24–26]. In this method, a membership function (MF) is regarded as a possibility distribution based on a
proposed theory; and an apparent possibility distribution expressed by fuzzy set theory is transferred into a possibility mea-
sure distribution. FRA method provides a useful tool for modelling risks and other risk parameters for risk analysis involving
the risks with incomplete or redundant safety information [2,8,18,34]. Because the contribution of each hazardous event to
the safety of a railway depot is different, the weight of the contribution of each hazardous event should be taken into
consideration in order to represent its relative contribution to the RL of the railway depot. Therefore, the weight factor
(WF) is introduced, which indicates the magnitude of the relevant importance of a hazardous event or hazard group to its
belongings in a risk tree. Fuzzy-AHP is then employed to calculate the WFs [2–4,6–9,14–17,35–41]. The outcomes of risk
assessment are represented as the risk degrees, the deﬁned risk categories of RLs with a belief of percentage and risk
contributions that provide safety analysts, managers, engineers and decision makers useful information to improve their
safety management and set safety standards. This article presents the development of a railway risk assessment system
using FRA and fuzzy-AHP.
After the introduction, Section 2 presents a new risk model. The application of qualitative descriptors and corresponding
MF to represents risk factors and RLs are discussed in Section 3 and the development of fuzzy rule base is also addressed to
describe the relationship among risk factors and RL expressions. Section 4 introduces the application of the proposed risk
assessment system and presents a case study on risk assessment of shunting at Hammersmith depot to demonstrate the pro-
posed risk assessment methodology. Finally, Section 5 gives conclusions and a summary of the main beneﬁts of using the
proposed methodology in railway risk analysis.
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2. Proposed safety risk assessment model
A risk assessment is a process that can be divided into ﬁve phases: problem deﬁnition phase; data and information col-
lection and analysis phase; hazard identiﬁcation phase; risk estimation phase and risk response phase [2,8,25,32]. This pro-
cess provides a systematic approach to the identiﬁcation and control of high-risk areas. A risk assessment model based on
FRA and fuzzy-AHP approaches is proposed as shown in Fig. 1 in which EI and UFN stand for expert index and uniform format
number, respectively. The proposed risk model consists of ﬁve phases: preliminary phase, design phase, FRA risk estimation
phase, fuzzy-AHP risk estimation phase and risk response phase. The details of the proposed risk model are described in the
following sections.
2.1. Preliminary phase
Risk assessment begins with problem deﬁnition which involves identifying the need for safety, i.e. speciﬁc safety require-
ments that should be made at different level, e.g. hazardous event level, hazard group level and the railway depot level. The
requirements may include sets of rules and regulations made by the national authorities and classiﬁcation societies, deter-
ministic requirements for safety, reliability, availability, maintainability, and criteria referring to probability of occurrence of
serious hazardous events and the possible consequences [2,8,25,32].
Once the need for safety is established, the risk assessment moves from the problem identiﬁcation to the data and infor-
mation collection and analysis. The aim of data and information collection and analysis is to develop a good understanding of
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Fig. 1. The proposed risk assessment model.
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what serious accidents and incidents occurred in a particular railway depot over the years and generate a body of informa-
tion. If the statistic data does not exist, expert and engineering judgements should be applied. The information gained from
data and information collection will then be used to deﬁne the standards of qualitative descriptors and associated MFs of risk
parameters, i.e. FF, CS, CP and RL.
The purpose of hazard identiﬁcation is to systematically identify all potential hazardous events associated with a railway
depot at each required level, e.g. hazardous event level, hazard group level with a view to assessing their effects on railway
depot safety. Various hazard identiﬁcation methods such as brainstorming approach, check-list, ‘what if?’, HAZOP (Hazard
and Operability), and failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), may be used individually or in combination to identify the
potential hazardous events of a railway depot [8,11,18,25,32]. The hazard identiﬁcation can be initially carried out to identify
hazardous events at hazardous event level, and then progressed up to hazard group level and ﬁnally to the depot level. The
information from hazard identiﬁcation will then be used to develop a risk tree.
2.2. Design phase
Once the risk information of a railway depot is obtained in preliminary phase, the risk assessment moves from prelimin-
ary phase to design phase. On the basis of information collection, the tasks in the design phase are to develop a risk tree and
MFs of FF, CS, CP and RL and a fuzzy rule base.
2.2.1. Development of a risk tree
There are many possible causes of risks that impact on railway depot safety. The purpose of development of a risk tree is
to decompose these risk contributors into adequate details in which risks associated with a railway depot can be efﬁciently
assessed [3,8]. A bottom-up approach is employed for the development of a risk tree. Fig. 2 shows a typical risk tree that can
be broken down into hazardous event level, hazard group level and the depot level. For example, hazardous events of
E1; E2; . . . ; En at hazardous event level affect the RL of S-HG1 at sub-hazard group level, the RLs of S-HG1; S-HG2;
. . . ; S-HGn contribute to the RL of HG2 at hazard group level and RLs of HG1; HG2; . . . ; HGn contribute to the overall RL of
a railway depot at system level.
2.2.2. Development of a fuzzy rule base
A fuzzy rule base consists of a set of fuzzy if-then rules [5,13,23,26] that are often employed to capture the imprecise
modes of reasoning, which plays an essential role in the human ability to make decisions in the environments of uncertainty
and imprecision. The fuzzy rules can be derived from several sources such as historical data analysis, engineering judgement
and expert knowledge. These approaches are mutually supporting and a combining of them is often the most effective way
to determine the rule base. A fuzzy rule is developed in terms of qualitative descriptors of input parameters: FF, CP, CS and
the output RL. The qualitative descriptors are characterised by fuzzy sets that are derived from historical incidents and acci-
dent information. The fuzzy sets are deﬁned in the universe of discourse and described by MFs. Currently, there are several
geometric mapping functions widely adopted, such as triangular, trapezoidal and S-shaped MFs. However, triangular and
trapezoidal MFs are the most frequently used in railway risk analysis practice [3,8,24,28]. For example, in the railway risk
assessment, input parameters of FF, CP, CS and output of RL are constructed by trapezoidal MFs, where the FF is deﬁned
as ‘Remote’, ‘Rare’, ‘Infrequent’, ‘Occasional’, ‘Frequent’, ‘Regular’, and ‘Common’; CS is deﬁned as ‘Negligible’, ‘Marginal’,
‘Moderate’, ‘Critical’, and ‘Catastrophic’; and CP is deﬁned as ‘Highly unlikely’, ‘Unlikely’, ‘Reasonably unlikely’, ‘Likely’, ‘Rea-
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Fig. 2. A typical risk tree.
M. An et al. / Information Sciences 181 (2011) 3946–3966 3949
Author's personal copy
sonably likely’, ‘Highly likely’ and ‘Deﬁnite’; the RL is deﬁned as ‘Low’, ‘Possible’, ‘Substantial’, and ‘High’. The fuzzy rules are
subjective deﬁned on the basis of expert experience and engineering judgement [5,13–18,23,38–41]. For example, in railway
risk analysis, the following rule is commonly used
If FF is ‘Remote’ and CS is ‘Negligible’ and CP is ‘Highly unlikely’, Then RL is ‘Low’.
2.2.3. Allocation of EIs to experts
Railway risk analysis is a very complicated subject, which is determined by numerous relevant risks associated with a
railway system. It is impossible for a single engineer or manager to consider all relevant aspects of a problem. Therefore,
many decision making processes take place in group settings by introducing linguistic preference relations under uncertain
linguistic environment [14–17,38–41]. In practice, risk assessment usually involves a number of experts with different back-
ground or discipline regarding the railway safety. Thus, these experts may have different impacts on the ﬁnal decision. The EI
is therefore introduced into the risk model to distinguish experts’ competence. Suppose there are n experts involved in the
risk assessment, the EI of the ith expert can be obtained by
EIi ¼ RIiPn
j¼1RIj
ð1Þ
where RIi is relevant importance of the ith expert according to his experience, knowledge and expertise, which takes an value
in the universe of 1 to 9. RI is deﬁned in a manner that ‘1’ means less importance, whereas ‘9’ means most importance. Obvi-
ously, it is necessary to review EIs when the topic or the circumstance has been changed.
2.3. FRA risk estimation phase
In the FRA risk estimation phase each risk is assessed at hazardous event level based on FF, CS and CP to calculate its RL.
However, railway risk analysts often face the circumstances where the risk data are incomplete or there is a high level of
uncertainty involved in the risk data. A ﬂexible method for expressing expert and engineering judgements is proposed
[2,3,8]. The uniform format number (UFN) is introduced to capture and convert expert and engineering subjective judge-
ments. As described earlier in this paper, this allows imprecision or approximate information in risk analysis process. There
are six steps to calculate RLs of hazardous events that are described as below.
2.3.1. Step 1: input FFs, CSs, and CPs
The input data usually can gather from historical data, but, however, in many circumstances, the data may not exist or
uncertainty involved in the risk data. Experts may provide their judgements on the basis of their knowledge and expertise
for each hazardous event [14–16]. The input values can be a precise numerical value, a range of numerical values or a lin-
guistic term. For example, if adequate information is obtained and the risk factor is quantitative measurable, an expert is
likely to provide a precise numerical value. However, experts sometimes ﬁnd that it is hard to give numerical values due
to uncertainties involved or the hazardous event is quantitative immeasurable, then a range of numerical values, a linguistic
term or a fuzzy number can be used in the proposed model [1–7,14–18,24,37–41], e.g. ‘‘CP is 60% to 70%’’, ‘‘CS is around 3 to 7
and most likely to be 5 in the universe of [0, 10]’’ and ‘‘FF is average’’.
2.3.2. Step 2: convert inputs into UFNs
Because the input values of hazardous events are crisps, e.g. a numerical value, a range of numerical value, a fuzzy num-
ber, or a linguistic term, the UFN is employed to convert these inputs into a uniform format for the composition of a ﬁnal
decision [2,3,8,14–22,37–41]. An UFN can be deﬁned as A ¼ fa; b; c; dg, and its corresponding MF indicates the degree of pref-
erence, which is deﬁned as
lAðxÞ ¼
ðx aÞ=ðb aÞ; xe½a; b;
1 xe½b; c
ðx dÞ=ðc  dÞ; xe½c;d;
0; otherwise:
8>><
>>:
9>>=
>>;
ð2Þ
where four real numbers (a, b, c and d) with satisfaction of the relationship a 6 b 6 c 6 d determine the x coordinates of the
four corners of a trapezoidal MF. Table 1 shows the possible inputs and its corresponding UFNs.
Table 1
Expert judgement and the corresponding UFNs.
Description Input Values Input type UFNs
‘‘. . . is a’’ fag A numerical value fa; a; a; ag
‘‘. . . is between a and b’’ fa; bg A range of number fa; ðaþ bÞ=2; ðaþ bÞ=2; ag
‘‘. . . is between a and c and most likely to be b’’ fa; b; cg Triangular fuzzy numbers fa; b; b; ag
‘‘. . . is between a and d and most likely between b and c’’ fa; b; c; dg Trapezoidal fuzzy numbers fa; b; c;dg
‘‘. . . is RARE’’ RARE A linguistic term RARE MF fa; b; c; dg
3950 M. An et al. / Information Sciences 181 (2011) 3946–3966
Author's personal copy
2.3.3. Step 3: aggregate UFNs
The aim of this step is to apply an appropriate operator to aggregate individual judgementmade by individual expert into a
group preference of each hazardous event. Based on EIs of experts obtained in the design phase, the expert judgments can be
aggregated according to weighted trapezoidal averaging operator [3,8,9,38–41]. Assumem experts involved in the risk assess-
ment and n experts provide non-zero judgments for the ith hazardous event, the aggregated UFN Ai can be determined by
Ai ¼ fai; bi; ci;dig ¼
Pm
k¼1a
i
kEIkPn
k¼1EIk
;
Pm
k¼1b
i
kEIkPn
k¼1EIk
;
Pm
k¼1c
i
kEIkPn
k¼1EIk
;
Pm
k¼1d
i
kEIkPn
k¼1EIk
( )
Aik ¼ faik; bik; cik; dikg ð3Þ
where aik; b
i
k; c
i
k and d
i
k are the numbers of UFN A
i
k that represents the judgement of the kth expert for the ith hazardous event
and EIk stands for the kth expert’s EI.
2.3.4. Step 4: calculate fuzzy values of UFNs
Assume AiFF ; A
i
CS and A
i
CP are three UFNs of FF, CS and CP of the ith hazardous event, respectively. Their corresponding fuzzy
sets ~AiFF , ~A
i
CS and ~A
i
CP are deﬁned as
~AiFF ¼ fðu;lAiFF ðuÞÞju 2 U ¼ ½0; u;lAiFF ðuÞ 2 ½0;1g ð4Þ
~AiCS ¼ fðv ;lAiCS ðvÞÞjv 2 V ¼ ½0;v ;lAiCS ðvÞ 2 ½0;1g ð5Þ
~AiCP ¼ fðw;lAiCP ðwÞÞjw 2 W ¼ ½0;w;lAiCP ðwÞ 2 ½0;1g ð6Þ
where lAiFF , lAiCS and lAiCP are trapezoidal MFs of A
i
FF , A
i
CS and A
i
CP , and u, v and w are input variables in the universe of discourse
U, V and W of FF, CS and CP, respectively.
2.3.5. Step 5: FRA evaluation
FRA evaluation is a process that is developed on the basis of Mamdani method [2,8,24] to determine which rules are rel-
evant to the current situation for calculating the fuzzy output, i.e. RL. Relations between input parameters FF, CS, CP and out-
put RL are presented in a form of if-then rules that have the following format
Ri : if u is ~BiFF and vis ~B
i
CS and w is ~B
i
CP; then x is ~B
i
RL; i ¼ 1;2; . . . ;n ð7Þ
where u;v ;w; and x are variables in the universe of discourse U, V, W and X of FF, CS, CP and RL, and ~BiFF , ~BiCS, ~BiCP and ~BiRL are
qualitative descriptors of FF, CS, CP and RL respectively, The calculation of the ﬁre strength of ai of the ith rule with input
fuzzy sets ~AiFF , ~A
i
CS and ~A
i
CP using fuzzy intersection operation is given by
ai ¼ min max lAiFF ðuÞ ^ lBiFF ðuÞ
 
;max lAiCSðvÞ ^ lBiCS ðvÞ
 
;max lAiCP ðwÞ ^ lBicp ðwÞ
 h i
ð8Þ
Where lAiFF ðuÞ;lAiCS ðvÞ and lAiCP ðwÞ are the MFs of fuzzy sets
~AiFF ; ~A
i
CS and ~A
i
CP , respectively, and lBiFF ðuÞ;lBiCS ðvÞ and lBiCP ðwÞ are
the MFs of fuzzy sets ~BiFF ; ~B
i
CS and ~B
i
CP of qualitative descriptors in rule Ri. After the fuzzy implication, the truncated MF l0BiRL
of
the inferred conclusion fuzzy set of rule Ri is obtained by
l0
BiRL
ðxÞ ¼ ai ^ lBiRL ðxÞ ð9Þ
where ai is the ﬁre strength of rule Ri; lBiRL ðxÞ is the MF of the qualitative descriptor ~B
i
RL and x is an input variable in the uni-
verse of discourse X.
The l0BRL ðxÞ of output fuzzy set can then be calculated by using fuzzy union (maximum) operation
l0BRL ðxÞ ¼ V
n
i¼1
l0
BiRL
ðxÞ ð10Þ
where l0
BiRL
is the MF of conclusion fuzzy set of rule Ri and n is the total number of rules in the rule base.
2.3.6. Step 6: defuzziﬁcation
Defuzziﬁcation is to convert the aggregated result to a crisp number that represents the ﬁnal result of the FRA evaluation.
The centroid of area method, which determines the centre of gravity of an aggregated fuzzy set, is employed for defuzziﬁ-
cation [2,8,24]. Assume the output fuzzy set obtained from the FRA evaluation is ~B0RL ¼ fðx;l0BRL ðxÞÞjx 2 X;l0BRL ðxÞ 2 ½0;1g, RL
i
of the ith hazardous event can be calculated
RLi ¼
Pm
j¼1l0BRLðxjÞ  xjPm
j¼1l0BRL ðxjÞ
ð11Þ
where m is the number of quantization level of X and xj 2 X, xj denotes the position of l0BRL ðxjÞ in RL expression, RL
i is the
aggregated output MF which indicates the position in the RL expression and also shows the extent to which RL belongs
and the corresponding membership degrees.
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2.4. Fuzzy-AHP risk estimation phase
As stated earlier in section 1, because the contribution of each hazardous event to the overall RL is different, the weight of
the contribution of each hazardous event should be taken into consideration in order to represent its relative contribution to
the RL of a railway depot. The application of fuzzy-AHP may also solve the problems of risk information loss in the hierar-
chical process in determining the relative importance of the hazardous events in the decision making process so that risk
assessment can be progressed from hazardous event level to hazard group level, and ﬁnally to a railway depot level. A fuz-
zy-AHP is an important extension of the traditional AHP method [22,35,36], which uses a similar framework of AHP to con-
duct risk analysis but fuzzy ratios of relative importance replace crisp ratios to the existence of uncertainty in the risk
assessment. An advantage of the fuzzy-AHP is its ﬂexibility to be integrated with different techniques, for example, FRA tech-
niques in risk analysis. Therefore, a fuzzy-AHP analysis leads to the generation of WFs for representing the primary hazard-
ous events within each category. There are six steps to calculate WFs as described below.
2.4.1. Step 1: establish an estimation scheme
Fuzzy-AHP determines WFs by conducting pairwise comparison. The comparison is based on an estimation scheme,
which lists intensity of importance using qualitative descriptors. Each qualitative descriptor has a corresponding triangular
MF that is employed to transfer expert judgments into a comparison matrix [3,8,23,38–41]. Table 2 describes qualitative
descriptors and their corresponding triangular fuzzy numbers for risk analysis at railway depots. Each grade is described
by an important expression and a general intensity number. When two risk contributors are of equal importance, it is con-
sidered (1,1,2). Fuzzy number of (8,9,9) describes that one risk contributor is absolutely important than the other one. Fig. 3
shows triangular MFs (solid lines) with ‘‘equal importance’’–(1,1,2), ‘‘weak importance’’–(2,3,4), ‘‘strong importance’’–(4,5,6),
‘‘very strong importance’’–(6,7,8) and ‘‘absolute importance’’–(8,9,9), respectively. The other triangular MFs (dash lines) de-
scribe the corresponding intermediate descriptors between them.
2.4.2. Step 2: compare risk contributors
‘‘HG1’’, ‘‘HG2’’,..., and ‘‘HGn’’ as shown in Fig. 2 are the risk contributors that contribute to overall RL of a railway depot.
Assume two risk contributors HG1 and HG2, if HG1 is of very strong importance than HG2, a fuzzy number of (6,7,8) is then
assigned to HG1 based on the estimation scheme as shown in Table 2. Obviously, risk contributor HG2 has fuzzy number of
(1/8,1/7,1/6). Suppose n risk contributors, there are a total of N ¼ nðn 1Þ=2 pairs need to be compared. The following clas-
siﬁcations can be used in the comparison.
- A numerical value, e.g. ‘‘3’’
- A linguistic term, e.g. ‘‘strong importance’’.
- A range, e.g. (2, 4), the scale is likely between 2 and 4.
- A fuzzy number, e.g. (2, 3, 4), the scale is between 2 and 4, most likely 3 or (2, 3, 4, 5), the scale is between 2 and 5, most
likely between 4 and 5.
- 0, e.g. the two risk contributors cannot be compared at all.
2.4.3. Step 3: convert comparison pairwise into UFNs
As described in steps 1 and 2, because the values of risk contributors are crisps, e.g. a numerical value, a range of numer-
ical value, a linguistic term or a fuzzy number, the FRA is employed again to convert these values into UFNs according to
Table 1. A series of UFNs can be obtained to correspond to the scores and the scales of the deﬁned risk contributors in
the risk tree.
Table 2
Fuzzy-AHP estimation scheme.
Qualitative descriptors Description Parameters of MFs
(triangular)
Equal importance (EQ) Two risk contributors contribute equally (1, 1, 2)
Between equal and weak importance (BEW) When compromise is needed (1, 2, 3)
Weak importance (WI) Experience and judgment slightly favour one risk contributor
over another
(2, 3, 4)
Between weak and strong importance (BWS) When compromise is needed (3, 4, 5)
Strong importance (SI) Experience and judgment strongly favour one risk
contributor over another
(4, 5, 6)
Between strong and very strong importance (BSV) When compromise is needed (5, 6, 7)
Very strong importance (VI) A risk contributor is favoured very strongly over the other (6, 7, 8)
Between very strong and absolute importance (BVA) When compromise is needed (7, 8, 9)
Absolute importance (AI) The evidence favouring one risk contributor over another is
of the highest possible order of afﬁrmation
(8, 9, 9)
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2.4.4. Step 4: aggregate UFNs
Usually, there are a number of experts in the risk assessment group, their judgements may be different. Therefore, UFNs
produced in Step 3 need to be aggregated into a group UFN for each risk contributor. The process is same as described in
section 2.3 at step 3.
2.4.5. Step 5: calculate WFs
The aggregated UFN are then used to construct a comparison matrix. Suppose C1;C2; :::;Cn are risk factors in a hazard
group p, Ai;j is the aggregated UFN representing the quantiﬁed judgement on Ci comparing to Cj and Ci is more important
than Cj. The pairwise comparison between Ci and Cj in the hazard group p thus yields a n n matrix deﬁned as
M ¼ ½Ai;j ¼
A1;1 A1;2    A1;n
A2:1 A2:2    A2:n
..
. ..
. . .
. ..
.
An;1 An;2 . . . An;n
2
66664
3
77775i; j ¼ 1;2; . . . ;n ð12Þ
Ai;j ¼ fai;j; bi;j; ci;j;di;jg;Aj;i ¼ f1=ai;j;1=bi;j;1=ci;j;1=di;jg
where ai;j; bi;j; ci;j and di;j are the numbers of UFN Ai;j.
The WFs can be calculated by using geometric mean method [8,14,18,31,32]. The UFN geometric mean Ai of the ith row in
the comparison matrix is deﬁned as
Ai ¼ fai; bi; ci; dig ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃYn
j¼1
ai;j
n
vuut ;
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃYn
j¼1
bi;j
n
vuut ; ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃprodnj¼1ci;jnq ;
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃYn
j¼1
di;j
n
vuut
8<
:
9=
; ð13Þ
Wi ¼ fai; bi; ci; dig ¼
aiPn
j¼1
dj
;
biPn
j¼1cj
;
ciPn
j¼1
bj
;
diPn
j¼1aj
( )
ð14Þ
where Wi is the fuzzy WF of Ci .
2.4.6. Step 6: defuzziﬁcation and normalization
Because the outputs of geometric mean method are fuzzy-WFs, a defuzziﬁcation is adopted to convert fuzzy-WFs to the
corresponding crisp WF [22]. Suppose a fuzzy-WF of w0i
w0i ¼
ai þ 2ðbi þ ciÞ þ di
6
ð15Þ
The WF of Ci can be calculated by
WFi ¼ w
0
iPn
j¼1w
0
j
ð16Þ
2.4.7. Step7: Calculate RLs of sub-hazard groups
Once theWFs of risk contributors are obtained, the overall RL at sub-hazard group can be calculated by synthesising of WF
and RL of each hazardous event produced in FRA risk estimation phase. The RL of a sub-hazard group S HGi is deﬁned by
RLSHGi ¼
Xn
i¼1RLCiWFCi i ¼ 1;2; . . . ;n ð17Þ
where RLCi and WFCi are the RL and WF of Ci.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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Fig. 3. MFs of qualitative descriptors in fuzzy-AHP estimation scheme.
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Similarly,WFSHGi of sub-hazard groups and WFHGi of hazard groups can be obtained by repeating steps 1 to 7. The RLs of
hazard groups and the overall RL of a railway depot can be obtained by
RLHGi ¼
Xn
i¼1RLSHGiWFSHGi i ¼ 1;2; . . . ;n ð18Þ
RLDepot ¼
Xn
i¼1RLHGiWFHGi i ¼ 1;2; . . . ;n ð19Þ
where RLHGi and WFHGi are the RL and WF of the ith hazard group HGi, RLSHGi and WFSHGi are the RL and WF of the ith sub-
hazard group and RLDepot is overall RL of the railway depot.
2.5. Risk response phase
The results produced from the risk estimation phases may be used through the risk response phase to assist risk analysts,
engineers and managers in developing maintenance and operation policies. If risks are high, risk reduction measures must be
applied or the depot operation has to be reconsidered to reduce the occurrence probabilities or to control the possible con-
sequences. However, the acceptable and unacceptable regions are usually divided by a transition region. Risks that fall in this
transition region need to be reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) [25,29,32]. In this study, the RLs are char-
acterized into four regions, i.e. ‘High’, ‘Substantial’, ‘Possible’ and ‘Low’.
3. A railway risk assessment prototype system
It has been noted that many risk assessment approaches currently used in the railway industry may have some problems
in situations where there is a lack of conﬁdence in risk assessment. A FRA-based approach combined with fuzzy-AHP tech-
nique may provide a solution as it emulates the reasoning process for synthesizing human expert judgements within a spe-
ciﬁc domain of knowledge, codes, and standards based on guidelines and company policy. A railway intelligent safety risk
assessment system (RISRAS) has been developed based on the proposed risk analysis model. It has been designed to aid
the railway risk assessment process via a user-friendly interface, hence requiring no knowledge of the manner in which
the data are stored and manipulated. The system has been developed using Microsoft Visual C++ and operates under Micro-
soft Windows 2000, NT, XP or Vista. The architecture of RISRAS has been designed to ensure that the system is adaptable and
upgradeable so that customisation of the system can be easily carried out. The current system is generic, but it is acknowl-
edged that individuals or corporations will prefer speciﬁc systems based on the rules in the particular cases. In order to min-
imise system changes and maintain the ﬂexibility and scalability of the system, the system is designed on the basis of the
three-layer architecture [3,10]: i.e. presentation logic layer, application logic layer and database layer as shown in Fig. 4. The
presenter can be thought of much like a web-browser that performs many functions involving user-interaction at presenta-
tion logic layer, but the bulk of the processing work is done behind the scenes, in this case, it is risk assessment server which
consists of a number of modules at application logic and database layers. The risk assessment server application controls the
data and information ﬂow between the presenter and the data stores/sources, which effectively forms the heart of the RIS-
RAS. This is particularly useful by using such a three-layer architecture in the system that allows other modules to be devel-
oped and added into the system conveniently. The main beneﬁt by using such architecture is that the data and analytical
process are completely separated from the user. This independence enables modiﬁcations to be made as each of the modules
individually with little or no impact on others. The roles of each layer are discussed in the following sections.
3.1. Presentation logic layer
The presentation logic layer provides the user with a user-friendly interface to aid the railway risk assessment process.
The presenter controls the graphical user interface, which the user can interact in order to perform the risk assessment pro-
cess. The presenter application makes a call to the sever then communicates with other layers through several input/output
functional modules, i.e. ‘Risk Tree Module (RTM)’, ‘Fuzzy Estimation Module (FEM)’, ‘Fuzzy Weighting Module (FWM)’ and ‘Out-
put Module (OM)’ as shown in Fig. 4.
As stated earlier in this paper, the RLs of hazard groups affect the overall RL of a railway depot, which can be further bro-
ken into sub-hazard groups in order to identify all possible hazardous events. The risk assessment can initially be carried out
from hazardous event level and then progressed up to sub-hazard group level, hazard group level and ﬁnally to depot level.
RTM module provides the user to create a risk tree that links by risk nodes. In this case, it is hazardous events, sub-hazard
groups, hazard groups with relevant information, i.e. belongings and descriptions.
FEM module consists of four sub-functional modules to process FRA evaluation. The ‘Project Conﬁguration’ deﬁnes the in-
put risk parameters, i.e. FF, CP and CS. The ‘Input/output conﬁguration’ deﬁnes the output RL in the risk assessment. The ‘MF
Conﬁguration’ deﬁnes the MFs to describe risk qualitative descriptors, fuzzy rules and fuzzy operations, which can be spec-
iﬁed for a particular case. As there could be a large amount of risk data involved in the risk analysis, the system provides an
‘Input Template’ functional module, which the user can easily input data manually or transfer data from an existing Microsoft
Excel ﬁle to the system.
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As stated earlier in this paper, fuzzy-AHP is employed to determine the relative importance of risk factors in order to syn-
thesize the contributions of risks at hazardous event level to hazard group level and ﬁnally to depot level. FWM module has
four functional modules. The ‘Estimation Scheme’ deﬁnes the estimation scheme as described in Section 2. It allows users to
add or modify MFs to create new scheme for a particular case. The ‘Questionnaire Creation’ can generate a Microsoft Excel ﬁle
on the basis of selected risk factors of the risk tree and then the ‘Questionnaire Evaluation’ creates a fuzzy-AHP comparison
matrix automatically by the system. The WF of each risk factor can ﬁnally be derived from the ‘Weight Evaluation’ functional
module.
The results of FRA and Fuzzy-AHP analysis will be ﬁnally synthesised to obtain an overall RL of a railway depot. There are
four functional modules in OM module, which enables the user to view and store the results into the database. The user can
use ‘Select Project’ functional module to manage risk trees and risk information established previously, which provides the
user to choose and re-use these risk trees and risk information in the future analysis. The user can also determine whether
WFs should or not be taken into consideration in the assessment process by selecting ‘Evaluation Conﬁguration’ functional
module. The ‘‘Output Result’’ functional module provides the user to display and save the results in a Microsoft Excel ﬁle.
3.2. Application logic layer
The application logic layer consists of four modules to manipulate data and information ﬂow. The FEM is developed based
on the proposed risk model using FRA approach to computer the RLs of hazardous events as described in Section 2.3. The
Fig. 4. The three-layer architecture of the railway risk assessment system.
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‘Data Collection’ sub-module takes the input data from a Microsoft Excel ﬁle via Open DataBase Connectivity (ODBC) connec-
tion to database [10]. ‘Fuzzy Evaluation’ sub-module performs the FRA risk estimation. RTM manages the risk trees estab-
lished in the risk analysis. By using the ‘Risk Tree Design’ sub-module, the user can create a risk tree for a particular case
and the ‘Risk Tree Import’’ sub-module delivers the risk trees to OM. The FWM is designed based on the fuzzy-AHP approach
proposed in the risk model as described in Section 2, which is used to quantify expert judgements and calculate the WFs. The
‘Questionnaire’ sub-module provides the user with a template in excel format via ODBC connection. The user can easily ﬁll in
the expert opinions on the template and then the ‘FAHP Analysis’ sub-module calculates the WFs and produces a fuzzy-AHP
comparison matrix. OM manages data ﬂow in risk assessment process and presents the results. The ‘Synthesis’ sub-module
ensures that the assessment is performed from hazardous event level then progressed up to sub-hazard group level, hazard
group level and ﬁnally to railway depot level according to the risk tree established in RTM by synthesizing the RLs of haz-
ardous events derived from FEM and the WFs from FWM. The ‘Formatting Output’ sub-module manages the format of the
output of results to a Microsoft Excel ﬁle via ODBC connection.
3.3. Database layer
Data is clearly fundamental to the operation of the RISRAS system. The database stores most of data and information that
RISRAS uses, such as risk tree, risk parameters, and WFs. The database chosen for the system is Microsoft Access. This pack-
age was selected based on several reasons, including, its popularity as a user-friendly relational database within industry, the
fact that it is available for a reasonable cost and its easy access via ODBC connection [10]. The ‘‘Excel Processor’’ module pro-
vides the functions to input and output of the data from or to a Microsoft excel ﬁle. The ‘‘Project Manager’’ manipulates data
of projects including the conﬁgurations of FRA and fuzzy-AHP in the RISRAS system as well the details of the risk trees.
4. A case study: Risk assessment of shunting at Hammersmith depot
An illustrated case example on risk assessment of shunting at Hammersmith depot is used to demonstrate the proposed
risk assessment methodology. The case materials have been collected from the industry [27,28]. The input parameters are FF,
CP and CS of hazardous events. The outputs of risk assessment are RLs of hazardous events, hazard groups, and the overall RL
of shunting at Hammersmith depot with risk scores located from 0 to 10 and risk categorized as ‘Low’, ‘Possible’, ‘Substantial’
and ‘High’ with a percentage belief. The RLs of hazard groups are calculated using the FRA based on the aggregation results of
each hazardous event belonging to the particular hazard group. The overall RL of shunting at Hammersmith depot is ob-
tained on the basis of the aggregation of the RLs of each hazard group contribution weighted by using fuzzy-AHP method.
The use of the RISRAS system in practice follows the risk assessment process described in Section 2.
4.1. Identiﬁcation
Hammersmith depot is one of the largest depots in London Underground. Historical data of accidents and incidents have
been recorded over the past ten years. In this case, the historical accident and incident databases have been reviewed in the
Hammersmith depot. Seven hazard groups and 17 sub-hazard groups have been identiﬁed and deﬁned, and each sub-hazard
group consists of a number of hazardous events [27,28], which are described as follows:
(1) Derailment hazard group (DHG) includes two sub-hazard groups i.e. typical outcome (minor injury) and worst-case
scenario (major injury) which have been identiﬁed based on the pervious accidents and incidents. Both sub-hazard
groups consist of six hazardous events such as track related faults including mechanical failure of track e.g. broken
rail and ﬁshplates, signalling related faults including mechanical failure of signals and points, rolling stock faults
including mechanical failure of rolling stock e.g. brakes, axles and bogies, structure failure including collapsed drain
or civil structure beneath track leading to derailment, object from train including object falls from train (e.g. motor)
leading to derailment (like Chancery Lane incident) and human errors including human error causing derailment e.g.
overspending, incorrect routing.
(2) Collision hazard group (CHG) consists of four sub-hazard groups i.e. collision between trains of worst case scenario
(fatality), collision between trains of typical outcome (multiple minor injuries), collision hazard of worst case scenario
(fatality) and collision hazard of typical outcome (minor injury). Collision between trains involves three scenarios. For
example, when MR train is moving out over infrastructure from OZ18 and LU train is moving out platform 3 due to
track or signal failure. Collision hazards include, for example, collision with object on track and collision with terminal
e.g. over running into buffer stop on road 24 due to excessive speed, brake failure or human error.
(3) Train ﬁre hazard group (TfHG) has one sub-hazard group i.e. train ﬁre typical outcome which covers minor injury
because ﬁres are believed that it would not be able to catch quick enough to endanger a driver more than through
smoke inhalation. There are two hazardous events resulting in the train ﬁre including arcing from conductor rail caus-
ing train ﬁre, and electrical, oil or hydraulic failure leading to train ﬁre.
(4) Electrocution hazard group (EHG) has two sub-hazard groups, typical outcome (fatality) and worst case scenario (major
injury), which cover a number of hazardous events, for example, contacting with conductor rail while entering/leaving
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cab, contacting with conductor rail while walking to train and plugging in gap jumper leads if train is stalled/gapped.
Due to high voltage direct current, fatality is most likely consequence. Therefore, even if injury is not fatal, it will still
be serious.
(5) Slips/trips hazard group (SHG) includes three sub-hazard groups, i.e. minor injury, major injury and fatality. The haz-
ardous events include, for example, instances when shunter is required to leave train, risks to other persons involved
in move and instances when person is required to approach train when it is stalled/gapped. However, slips/trips are
acknowledged as high frequency and low consequence events. Therefore, majority of slips and trips has been agreed as
a minor injury and fatalities are very unlikely. There is only a chance of broken bones if slip or trip badly.
(6) Falls from height hazard group (FHG) consists of three sub-hazard groups i.e. minor injury, major injury and fatality
which cover the events of falls from height agreed as when shunter leaves train cab. However, falls from height are
much more likely than a slip/trip to result in major injury.
(7) Train strikes person hazard group (TsHG) has been identiﬁed based on the record in the past ten years into two sub-
hazard groups – major injury and fatality. The hazardous events in these two sub-hazard groups include train strikes
authorized person including other depot workers (e.g. ground shunter) or track side staff and train strikes unautho-
rized person e.g. trespassers, etc. Side swipe collision is considered non-fatal but still serious. Collision on head is con-
sidered fatal.
As described in Section 2, a risk tree has been developed for risk analysis of shunting at Hammersmith depot as shown in
Fig. 5. Risk assessment is initially carried out from hazardous events and then progressed up to sub-hazard group level, haz-
ard group level and ﬁnally to depot level.
The qualitative descriptors of FF, CS, CP and RL have been developed for the analysis of hunting at Hammersmith depot
and the FRA is employed to estimate the RL of each hazardous event in terms of FF, CS and CP. The deﬁnition of FF deﬁnes the
number of times of an event occurs over a speciﬁed period, e.g. number of events/year. The qualitative descriptors of FF are
deﬁned as ‘Remote’, ‘Rare’, ‘Infrequent’, ‘Occasional’, ‘Frequent’, ‘Regular’ and ‘Common’ and their meanings are presented in
Table 3.
CS describes the magnitude of possible consequence in terms of number of fatalities, major and minor injuries resulting
from the occurrence of a particular hazardous event. The qualitative descriptors of CS are deﬁned as ‘Negligible’, ‘Marginal’,
‘Moderate’, ‘Critical’, and ‘Catastrophic’ and their meanings are shown in Table 4, where major and minor injuries are calcu-
lated in terms of equivalent fatalities. 10 major injuries or 200 minor injuries are considered equal to one equivalent fatality
[25,32,34]. For example, qualitative descriptor ‘Marginal’ is deﬁned to describe the consequence level of minor injury with an
approximate numerical value of 0.005.
CP deﬁnes the FF that failure effects that will happen given the occurrence of the failure. One may often use such qual-
itative descriptors as ‘Highly unlikely’, ‘Unlikely’, ‘Reasonably unlikely’, ‘Likely’, ‘Reasonably likely’, ‘Highly likely’ and ‘Def-
inite’. Table 5 shows the evaluation criteria of CP and the corresponding qualitative descriptors.
Fig. 5. Hazard identiﬁcation at different levels for Hammersmith depot.
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The qualitative descriptors of RL are deﬁned as ‘Low’, ‘Possible’, ‘Substantial’, and ‘High’. Their deﬁnitions, which are gen-
erally similar to those described in EN50126, EN50129, and GE/GN8561 [12,13,32], are listed in Table 6. The risk score is
deﬁned in a manner that the lowest score is 0, whereas the highest score is 10. For example, qualitative descriptor, ‘Low’,
is deﬁned on the basis of the risk score ranging from 0 to 2. Similar to the input qualitative descriptors of FF, CS and CP,
the trapezoidal MFs are used to describer the RL. The results of RLs can be expressed either risk score located in the range
from 0 to 10 or as risk category with a belief of percentage.
Because three parameters of FF, CP, and CS are used to determine the RLs of hazardous events, the rule base therefore
consists of 245 if-then rules for this study. Fig. 6 shows ﬁve rule matrices. As can be seen that each matrix consists of 49
rules with a particular qualitative descriptor of CS. For example, the rule at the top left of the matrix of CS = Negligible would
be expressed as follows:
IF FF is Remote and CP is Highly unlikely and CS = Negligible, THEN RL is Low
The RISRAS provides the user a design panel to develop the rule bases, which enable the user to update or modify rules
depending on particular cases easily.
Table 3
Deﬁnitions of qualitative descriptors of FF.
Index Qualitative
descriptors
Description Mid-point of the
estimated frequency
Approximate numerical
value (event/yr)
Parameters of MFs (trapezoid)
1 Remote < 1 in 175 years 1 in 500 years 0.002 0.00, 0.00, 2.00E3, 6.00E3
2 Rare 1 in 35 years to 1 in 175 years 1 in 100 years 0.01 2.00E3, 6.00E3, 1.50E2, 4.00E2
3 Infrequent 1 in 7 years to 1 in 35 years 1 in 20 years 0.05 1.50E2, 4.00E2, 8.00E2, 2.00E1
4 Occasional 1 in 1 1=4 years to 1 in 7 years 1 in 4 years 0.25 8.00E2, 2.00E1, 5.00E1, 1.25
5 Frequent 1 in 3 months to 1 in 1 1=4 years 1 in 9 months 1.25 5.00E1, 1.25, 2.25, 5.25
6 Regular 1 in 20 days to 1 in 3 months 1 in 2 months 6.25 2.25, 5.25, 10.25, 31.25
7 Common 1 in 4 days to 1 in 20 days 1 in 12 days 31.25 10.25, 31.25, 1.00E2, 1.00E2
Table 4
Deﬁnitions of qualitative descriptors of CS.
Index Qualitative
descriptors
Description Numerical
values
Parameters of MFs (trapezoid)
1 Negligible No injury and/or negligible damage to the system 0–0.009 0.00, 0.00, 9.00E3, 2.00E2
2 Marginal Minor system damage and/or minor injury 0.009–0.1 9.00E3, 2.00E2, 1.00E1, 2.00E1
3 Moderate Failure causes some operational dissatisfaction and/or major injury 0.1–0.4 1.00E1, 2.00E1, 4.00E1, 5.00E1
4 Critical Major system damage and/or severe injury 0.4–0.9 4.00E1, 5.00E1, 9.00E1, 2.00
5 Catastrophic System loss and/or fatality >0.9 9.00E1, 2.00, 5.00, 5.00
Table 5
Deﬁnitions of qualitative descriptors of CP.
Index Qualitative
descriptors
Description Parameters of MFs (trapezoid)
1 Highly unlikely The occurrence likelihood of accident is highly unlikely 0.00, 0.00, 1.50E1, 2.00E1
2 Unlikely The occurrence likelihood of accident is unlikely but possible given the occurrence
of the failure event
1.50E1, 2.00E1, 2.50E1, 3.00E1
3 Reasonably
unlikely
The occurrence likelihood of accident is between likely and unlikely 2.50E1, 3.00E1, 3.50E1, 4.25E1
4 Likely The occurrence likelihood of accident is likely 3.50E1, 4.25E1, 5.75E1, 6.50E1
5 Reasonably
likely
The occurrence likelihood of accident is between likely and highly likely 5.75E1, 6.50E1, 7.00E1, 7.50E1
6 Highly likely The occurrence likelihood of accident is very likely 7.00E1, 7.50E1, 8.00E1, 8.50E1
7 Deﬁnite The accident occurs given the occurrence of the failure event 8.00E1, 8.50E1, 1.00, 1.00
Table 6
Deﬁnitions of qualitative descriptors of RL.
Qualitative descriptors Description Parameters of MFs (trapezoid)
Low Risk is acceptable 0, 0, 1, 2
Possible Risk is tolerable but should be further reduced if it is cost-effective to do so 1, 2, 4, 5
Substantial Risk must be reduced if it is reasonably practicable to do so 4, 5, 7, 8
High Risk must be reduced to safe in exceptional circumstances 7, 8, 10, 10
3958 M. An et al. / Information Sciences 181 (2011) 3946–3966
Author's personal copy
In this case, ﬁve experts with high qualiﬁcation regarding this subject are involved in the risk assessment group. EIs are
allocated to experts by Eq. (1) on the basis of their background and experience as shown in Table 7. For example, the expert
E5 has less experience. Therefore, he has a lowest EI ¼ 0:16 .
4.2. FRA risk estimation
Table 8 shows the inputs of FF, CS and CP of sub-hazard groups. For example, the FF, CS and CP of ‘derailment (typical
outcome)’ sub-hazard group are ‘3.33E2’, ‘9.90E1’, and ‘5.00E3’ respectively. These crisp values are then converted into
corresponding UFNs according to Table 1 and Eq. (2). Because the numerical data have been obtained from the historical re-
cords, there is no need to aggregate expert judgements. In this case, AiFF ¼ AiFF;k, AiCP ¼ AiCP;k, AiCS ¼ AiCS;k.
According to Eqs. (4)–(6), UFNs are then transferred into fuzzy sets to obtain ~AFF , ~ACS and ~ACP . For example, the fuzzy sets
~AFF ; ~ACPand~ACS of ‘derailment (typical outcome)’ sub-hazard group are:
~AFF ¼ ðu;lAiFF ðuÞÞju 2 ½0;100;lAiFF ðuÞ ¼
1 u ¼ 0:0333
0 otherwise
  
~ACP ¼ ðv;lAiCP ðvÞÞjv 2 ½0;100;lAiCP ðvÞ ¼
1 v ¼ 0:99
0 otherwise
  
~ACS ¼ ðw;lAiCS ðwÞÞjw 2 ½0;100;lAiCSðwÞ ¼
1 w ¼ 0:005
0 otherwise
  
In the fuzzy inference process, the ﬁre strength of each rule with input fuzzy sets can be calculated by Eq. (8). Then, the fuzzy
implication is applied to obtain the conclusion fuzzy sets of the ﬁred rules. The truncated MF of the conclusion fuzzy set of
each rule can be obtained by Eq. (9). Finally, the conclusion fuzzy sets are aggregated by Eq. (10) to form a single fuzzy set
which represents the fuzzy output of RL.
On the basis of the aggregated fuzzy set, by using Eq. (11) defuzziﬁcation calculates the defuzziﬁed value, which is a crisp
value, standing for the ﬁnal result of fuzzy inference as shown in Table 8. For example, the RL of ‘‘derailment (typical out-
come)’ sub-hazard group is 3 which indicates that risk score of 3 and risk categories of ‘possible’ with a belief of 78% and
Fig. 6. Fuzzy rule base matrices.
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substantial of 22%. Similarly, the RLs of other sub-hazard groups can be calculated. RLs of sub-hazard groups are summarised
in Table 8. The results of sub-hazard groups of EFA analysis [27,28] are also given in Table 8. The EFA value of each sub-haz-
ard group and each hazardous event can be calculated as
EFAjsubgroup ¼
Xn
i¼1EFAi ði ¼ 1;2; . . . ;nÞ ð20Þ
EAFi ¼ FFi  CSi ð21Þ
where EFAjsubgroup is the EFA value of the jth sub-hazard group that has n failure events and EFAi is the EFA value of the ith
failure event. The EFA method only has two input parameters in its analysis process and this method cannot determine the
contribution weight of each sub hazard groups to the overall RL of a railway depot. Therefore, the assessment can only be
carried out at sub-hazard group level. By comparing both results from proposed risk model and EFA, it is worth to notice
that although EFA method has a different output format comparing with the proposed method, but, however, both of meth-
ods determine that ‘‘electrocution (typical outcome)’’ sub hazard group has higher risk than other sub hazard groups, and
also the proposed method is able to provide distinct risk rankings for the assessment comparing to the EFA method. More-
over, the proposed method can provides more reliable and comprehensive results that provide railway engineers, maintain-
ers and managers with valuable information for risk response decision making.
Table 7
Expert Index (EIs).
Experts Years of experience EIs
E1 10 years experience 0.21
E2 15 years experience 0.24
E3 10 years experience 0.21
E4 8 years experience 0.18
E5 5 years experience 0.16
E1 + E2 + E3 + E4 + E5 = 1.00
Table 8
Shunting at Hammersmith depot.
Operation Hazard
Groups
Index Subhazard Groups Failure
Frequency
Consequence
Probability
Consequence
Severity
Risk
Score
Risk Category EFA Risk
Score
Shunting at
Hammersmith
depot
Derailment 1 Derailment (typical
outcome)
3.33E2 9.90E1 5.00E3 3.00 Possible: 78% 7
(Medium)Substantial: 22%
2 Derailment (worst case
scenario)
3.33E2 1.00E2 1.25E1 0.81 Low: 100% 4 (Low)
Collision 3 Collision between trains
(worst case scenario)
3.00E2 2.00E1 6.25E1 2.52 Possible: 100% 6 (Low)
4 Collision between trains
(typical outcome)
3.00E2 8.00E1 2.50E2 3.00 Possible: 100% 4 (Low)
5 Collision hazard (typical
outcome)
1.20E1 9.90E1 5.00E3 4.04 Possible: 96%
Substantial: 4%
4 (Low)
6 Collision hazard (worst
case scenario)
1.20E1 1.00E2 1.25E1 0.82 Low: 100% 4 (Low)
Train ﬁre 7 Train ﬁre (typical
outcome)
1.50E2 1.00 5.00E3 3.00 Possible: 100% 6
(Medium)
Electrocution 8 Electrocution (typical
outcome)
5.71E2 7.50E1 6.25E1 6.00 Substantial:
100%
8 (High)
9 Electrocution (best case
scenario)
5.71E2 2.50E1 1.25E1 0.80 Low: 100% 5 (Low)
Slips/trips 10 Slips / trips (minor injury) 2.00E1 8.00E1 5.00E3 3.00 Possible: 100% 5 (Low)
11 Slips / trips (major injury) 2.00E1 1.50E1 1.25E1 0.80 Low: 100% 5 (Low)
12 Slips / trips (fatality) 2.00E1 5.00E2 6.25E1 3.00 Possible: 100% 6
(Medium)
Falls from
height
13 Falls from height (minor
injury)
1.43E2 1.50E1 5.00E3 0.75 Low: 100% 2 (Low)
14 Falls from height (major
injury)
1.43E2 8.00E1 1.25E1 3.00 Possible: 100% 5 (Low)
15 Falls from height (fatality) 1.43E2 5.00E2 6.25E1 0.75 Low: 100% 5 (Low)
Train strikes
person
16 Train strikes person
(major injury)
1.00E1 5.00E1 1.25E1 3.00 Possible: 100% 6
(Medium)
17 Train strikes person
(fatality)
1.00E1 5.00E1 6.25E1 3.54 Possible: 100% 7
(Medium)
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4.3. Fuzzy-AHP risk estimation
In order to obtain the overall RL of shunting at Hammersmith depot, the relative importance of the contribution of hazard
groups are taken into account. Therefore, the WFs of hazard groups are calculated and then synthesised with the RLs of haz-
ard groups to determine the RL at railway depot level as described in Section 2.
The estimation scheme has been agreed and established by the experts in the risk assessment group as shown in Table 2.
Table 9 shows the expert judgements of relative importance of hazard groups. Experts can use linguistic terms, numerical
numbers, ranges and fuzzy numbers to express their opinions. For example, when comparing CHG with DHG, experts agree
that CHG is more important than DHG. But they have different judgement on the importance degree, which experts E1, E2, E3,
E4 and E5 chose ‘WI’, ‘BWS’, ‘4, 6’, ‘4, 5’ and ‘BWS’, respectively. According to Table 1, the judgements are converted into UFNs.
The converted UFNs are then aggregated with respect to EIs by using Eq. (3). The aggregated UNFs are shown in Table 9.
The comparison matrix M is then established with these aggregated UNFs by Eq. (12). The completed comparison matrix
M is shown in Table 10.
The UFN geometric mean Ai of the ith row in the comparison matrix is calculated by Eq. (13). Then fuzzy Wi of WFs of
hazard groups can be calculated by Eq. (14). The crisp value w0i of fuzzy WF Wi can be obtained by Eq. (15). The ﬁnal WF
of hazardous groups WFi is determined by Eq. (16) as shown in Table 11.
Once the WFs of hazard groups are obtained, the RL at railway depot level RLDepot can be derived from the synthesis of
hazard group’s WFs and RLs by Eq. (17) as shown in Table 11. As can be seen that the overall RL of shunting at Hammersmith
depot is 3.29 which indicates ‘Possible’ with a belief of 100 percent.
4.4. Risk response phase
The overall RL of shunting at Hammersmith depot is 3.29 belonging to risk category of ‘Possible’ with a belief of 100%. This
requires risk reduction measures to reduce the overall RL of depot to ALARP. Seven hazard groups effect the overall RL esti-
mation at the Hammersmith depot. It should be noted that each hazard group contributes a different weight value to the
overall RL of depot. As can be seen from Table 11 that the major contributions are from the hazard groups of ‘Train strikes
person’, ‘Collision’ and ‘Eelectrocution’, which contributed 30%, 27% and 19%, respectively, to overall RL of shunting at Ham-
mersmith depot. Each hazard group consists of a number of hazardous events. For example, in this case, there are two main
hazardous events in ‘Train strikes person’ hazard group such as ‘Train strikes authorized person’ and ‘Train strikes unauthorized
person’, which result in personal injury or fatality. Based on the accident and incident reports and statistics, majority of train
striking person risk is put down to human errors. Therefore, in order to reduce RLs of ‘Train strikes authorised person’ such as
track side staff, reference manual procedures and ofﬁcial walkways should be provided to avoid possible accidents. At the
same time, depot familiarization and depot track accustomed certiﬁcation are necessary to reduce the frequency of the haz-
ardous events and possibility to a certain consequence. For example, PPE could be provided to reduce the frequency of the
hazardous event and possibility to serious consequence and the possible loss from the accidents. With regard to ‘Train strikes
unauthorized person’ such as trespassers, various security measures should be carried out such as CCTV, controlled access and
egress to depot and platform end barriers. Furthermore, other potential control measures to reduce train striking person
risks including staff training, limiting train speed and use of brakes and whistles on trains, which are effective measures
to reduce RLs of both hazardous events. The potential control measures to reduce other hazardous events in other hazard
groups and the proposed strategy for each addition control measures have been recommended to industry.
The hazard groups of ‘Train ﬁre’, ‘Derailment’, ‘Slips/trips’ and ‘Falls from height’ contribute less than the above hazard
groups with 10%, 8%, 4% and 2%, respectively. Although these hazard groups have relatively minor contribution to the overall
RL of shunting at Hammersmith depot, the control measures are still done to reduce those hazardous events whose RLs fall in
the transition region, i.e. ‘Possible’ and ‘Substantial’. For example, the hazard group of ‘Train ﬁre’ contributes 10% to the overall
RL of depot. As the major ﬁre related hazardous events leading to system failure or personal injury and health hazards in-
clude arcing and mechanical failure, therefore, the suggested control measures are to provide maintenance and inspection of
ﬂeet and track assets regularly. In addition, installed ﬁre extinguishers in cab could mitigate consequence and reduce the
chance to severe outcomes.
Table 11
RLs of hazard groups at Hammersmith depot.
Operation Index Hazard groups Risk score Risk category WF Contribution
Shunting at Hammersmith depot
(3.29, Possible: 100%)
1 Derailment 2.31 Possible: 100% 0.12 8%
2 Collision 3.3 Possible: 100% 0.27 27%
3 Train ﬁre 3 Possible: 100% 0.11 10%
4 Electrocution 4.47 Possible: 53% 0.14 19%
Substantial: 47%
5 Slips/trips 2.4 Possible: 100% 0.06 4%
6 Falls from height 2.17 Possible: 100% 0.04 2%
7 Train strikes person 3.54 Possible: 100% 0.27 30%
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5. Conclusions
Traditionally risk assessment techniques currently used in the railway industry have adopted a probabilistic approach,
which heavily rely on the availability and accuracy of data, sometimes they are unable to deal adequately incomplete or
uncertain data. This paper presents a new systematic railway risk assessment model using FRA and fuzzy-AHP, which is able
to deal with both quantitative and qualitative risk data and information. A new risk parameter of consequence probability
(CP) is introduced in order to obtain more reliable results of risk assessment, which the hazardous events with high CP can be
properly assessed and identiﬁed. The outcomes of risk assessment are the RLs of hazardous events, hazard groups and a rail-
way system and corresponding risk categories as well as risk contributions. It will provide railway risk analysts, managers
and engineers with useful information to improve safety management and set safety standards.
A prototype railway safety risk assessment system is presented in this paper. Some screen shots of the proposed railway
risk assessment system are shown in Fig. 7. This system consists of a user-friend interface that controls the risk assessment
process including a project manager, an Excel processor, and a database management system, which is easy to use and up-
date. A case study of risk analysis of shunting at Hammersmith depot is used to demonstrate the application of the proposed
risk analysis methodology. Comparing with the conventional methods, that advantages of the proposed risk assessment sys-
tem can be summarized as: (1) it can handle expert knowledge, engineering judgments, and risk historical data for the rail-
way risk assessment in a consistent manner, (2) it can use imprecise, ambiguous and uncertainty information in the
assessment, (3) the risk can be evaluated directly using linguistic expressions which are employed in the risk assessment,
(4) the risk can assessed effectively on the basis of knowledge base built by transforming information from various sources,
Fig. 7. Proposed RISRAS system.
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and (5) it provides a more ﬂexible structure for combining failure frequency, consequence and consequence probability in
risk analysis.
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